On 9
September 2016, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment (see here) in the latest high
profile case to deal with a number of serious allegations concerning the conduct
of the British Armed Forces during the Iraq War. The case touched upon a number
of contentious issues, but most importantly for this blog, the Court had to
consider the reach of the United Kingdom’s international human rights obligations
beyond British territory. Although the decision of the court slightly retreats from
the far-reaching judgment of the High Court on this issue (see here), the case marks an
interesting contribution nonetheless and is surely destined for further
litigation. The judgment also raises a number of issues which have
ramifications beyond the constraints of the particular case, most notably in
relation to the role of human rights lawyers who have been heavily criticised
by the Prime Minister in recent months, and the changing nature of warfare and counter-terrorist
methods.
The case concerned numerous allegations of fatal shootings,
ill-treatment, disappearances and complicity with the United States of America over
allegations of torture. The key questions to come before the Court of Appeal focussed
upon the now regularly confronted issue of the extra-territorial application of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the extent of the UK’s
obligations under the ECHR to investigate allegations of torture and unlawful
detention; and the applicability of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the
English and Welsh legal system.
On the
first issue, the Court of Appeal disagreed in part with the High Court, finding
that the shooting of an individual who was not detained by the Armed Forces was
not in itself sufficient to demonstrate control for the purposes of
establishing jurisdiction, as Leggatt J had previously found. Although Leggatt
J held that shooting someone represented the ‘ultimate
exercise of physical control over another human being’, the Court of Appeal held that it was for the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to extend the principles espoused in the
leading Banković and Al-Skeini cases, which require an element of physical power and
control. For the Court of Appeal, killing someone who was not detained by the
shooter clearly lacked the fundamental element of control. In light of the Al-Saadoon decisions in the British
courts, a number of important fundamental issues persist.
Given
the scale and frequency of British military interventions abroad in recent
years, it is obvious that the domestic courts will have to regularly contend
with serious allegations concerning the conduct of the British Armed Forces. This
will require the domestic courts and the ECtHR to persistently grapple with the
issue of extra-territoriality. As is well known, the ECtHR has responded to
this issue in the numerous appeals arising out of the invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively (see Al-Skeini, Al-Jedda, Jaloud, Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi). Moreover, the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (see here) will have its hands
full for several years as it aims to conclude its investigation into
allegations of abuse by 2019.
However,
lawyers acting on behalf of Iraqi civilians have faced much criticism for
taking action against the British Armed Forces. In her closing speech at the
recent Conservative Party conference, the Prime Minister, Theresa May,
announced that in future conflicts the Government would not let ‘activist
left-wing human rights lawyers harangue and harass the bravest of the brave’ in
the British Army (see here). This followed an
earlier and equally controversial policy announcement that the UK would
derogate from certain human rights obligations in future conflicts (see here). Criticism of this
announcement has been abundant as lawyers and academics have questioned how any
such blanket derogation would satisfy the requirements for a derogation
under Article 15 of the ECHR to be lawful, not least of all the principles of
necessity and proportionality.
One
of the leading law firms to challenge the Government in recent years and represent
individuals who claim to have been mistreated during the Iraq War was Public
Interest Lawyers, led by Phil Shiner. The firm was consistently lambasted by some
politicians due to the frequency of allegedly vexatious allegations against
British troops. Of course, whether a claim is vexatious or not should be a
decision of a court and not a politician, but the issue of gathering sufficient
evidence and deciding which claims should be advanced is a trickier question,
especially if done so with taxpayer money. Nevertheless, the firm closed on 31
August 2016 after it lost legal aid funding amidst accusations of misconduct
(see here).
A
further issue raised once again in light of the Al-Saadoon judgment concerns the increasingly complex nature of contemporary
warfare and counter-terrorism in which the United Kingdom participates. In
particular, many of the key legal notions underpinning international
humanitarian law and international human rights law have been grossly
politicised in recent years and are subject to differing interpretations.
Equally, these challenges will intensify given the particularly murky nature of
British involvement in some conflicts, most notably in Yemen (see here and here). As atypical methods
of warfare and counter-terrorism (i.e. through proxy or targeted killing) supersede
traditional battlefield deployment and criminal justice processes, the courts
will have to apply the principle of jurisdiction to the changing nature of conflict
and counter-terrorism.
In light of these
issues, the implications of these judgments are extremely concerning. If, as the Court of Appeal contended, an element of
‘physical power and control’ over the individual was indeed necessary to
establish jurisdiction, then it would be impossible to establish jurisdiction when
a State killed an individual by means of a drone strike. Equally, when one
considers the nature of proxy warfare which inherently avoids the use of any
‘physical control’ over individuals, then establishing jurisdiction for the
purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR becomes an impossible task.
In that regard, it
is deeply troubling if States are able to avoid having to consider their
obligations under international human rights law if they deliberately conduct
themselves in a way which does not involve their personnel exercising
territorial control, or physical control over individuals. Such a legal
position only serves to incentivise proxy warfare and targeted killings.
Equally, as David Hart has argued, ‘it may be said that a sniper picking off a
civilian at 1km would be non-justiciable, whereas soldiers cornering a group of
civilians up an alley-way before swiftly despatching them would arguably give
rise to a justiciable killing’ (see here). Indeed, the increasingly complex and evolving nature of
warfare and counter-terrorism may necessitate the involvement of ‘activist
left-wing human rights lawyers’ more than ever if the law is in a state of
uncertainty and needs clarification.
Even so, the Al-Saadoon judgment further reinforces
the need for the British Government to implement the recommendations made in
the Report of
the Baha Mousa Inquiry in a transparent manner in order to learn from the
mistakes of the past. The public must have confidence that allegations of unlawful
killings and abuse are taken seriously and that steps are actively taken to
prevent them re-occurring. Taking aim at human rights lawyers at every
opportunity does not serve the interests of democracy or, more importantly, the
rule of law, which requires that the Government is scrutinised and held to
account if necessary. Additionally, the British Government must take heed of
the High Court’s recommendation in Ali Zaka Mousa, and
commit to establishing an ‘inquisitorial inquiry
derived from the model used by coroners’ to investigate allegations of
abuse by Iraqi civilians by UK armed forces. According to the
High Court, this method inquiry would be better placed to ‘assess the systemic
issues and to take account of lessons learnt is discharged in a way that
provides greater transparency and public accountability’.
Although
the Court of Appeal in Al-Saadoon overturned
arguably the most interesting and certainly the most far-reaching aspect of the
High Court judgment, the suggestion that any use of lethal force by the Armed
Forces (regardless of physical control) invokes jurisdiction should be seriously
considered again in the future. This is particularly vital in light of the
changing nature of warfare and the use of targeted killing. If the Al-Saadoon appeal progresses to the
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, as commentators believe,
then the higher courts will have to reconcile the judgments.
The writer, Ben Stanford, is an academic based in London, with a keen interest in International Human Rights and International Criminal Law. Previously, he has completed a Masters in International Criminal Law at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Terrorism and International Human Rights.
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